American Indian Law Review
Volume 20

Number 2

1-1-1996

A Matter of Trust: Federal Environmental Responsibilities to
Native Americans Under Customary International Law
Karyn I. Wendelowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Karyn I. Wendelowski, A Matter of Trust: Federal Environmental Responsibilities to Native Americans
Under Customary International Law, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 423 (1996),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol20/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University
of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

COMMENT
A MATTER OF TRUST: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES TO NATIVE AMERICANS UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Karyn I. Wendelowski*
If the water is depleted the Hopis will be cut offfrom this holy
land where they have a covenant with their creator.
Vernon Masayesva, Hopi tribal chairman,
on the effect of coal mining on Hopi land1
All our lands on the hill
No longer can be used
Will become home of craters and rocks.
-

Nauruan song, lamenting the fate of Topside,
the phosphate-bearing central plateau of Nauru2

The Black Mesa-Kayenta coal mine complex on Native American land in
Arizona is the world's largest strip mine. Nauru, a tiny island in the Pacific,
has been made almost uninhabitable by phosphate mining. Nauruans and
Native Americans share a history with many other countries whose lands offer
valuable natural resources, but whose people do not have the technology to
develop those resources. This is a history in which nonnatives developed the
resources and received nearly all economic benefit from those resources, while
leaving behind environmental destruction.' The governments which arranged
for and approved of the mining did not fulfill their obligations to these
aboriginal peoples. Nauru has found a partial solution with a multimilliondollar settlement from Australia. The Navajo and Hopi of Black Mesa can

*Associate, Van Ness Feldman. J.D., 1995, magna cum laude, Georgetown University Law
Center. Third place winner, 1994-95 American Indian Law Review writing competition.
1. Tom Kenworthy, Hopis Feel Their Life Blood DrainingAway: Arizona Tribe Blames
Water Problem on Coal Being Transportedto Nevada PowerPlant,WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1993,
at A14 [hereinafter Hopis Feel Their Life Blood DrainingAway].
DAMAGE UNDER
NAURU:
ENVIRONMENTAL
2. CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY,
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP 29 (1992). This volume is the report of a commission established
by the Government of Nauru to discover which government should accept responsibility for
rehabilitating the mined areas of phosphate land and the cost and feasibility of any proposed
rehabilitation. Christopher Weeramantry is a Professor of Law at Monash University.
3. James Cook, New Hope on the Reservations, FORBES, Nov. 9, 1981, at 108 [hereinafter
New Hope on the Reservations].
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look to that settlement to find their own solution in the courts of the United
States.
The history of Native Americans on reservation lands begins with the fact
that the 51.9 million acres the United States reserved for the Indians,
unbeknownst to the politicians distributing the land, contained tremendous
stores of the nation's natural resources.4 Given the federal government's
neglect and their isolation from technological developments, Native Americans
were not technically capable, even if inclined, to develop their natural
resources for profit.5 Today, Native Americans have become America's most
disadvantaged minority, with "adisproportionate share of their population illhoused, ill-educated, unhealthy, ill-paid and underemployed." 6 Their burdens
increase while Indians can only watch as the land and water which is vital to
their survival is destroyed with the approval of the federal government.
This comment argues that there is a customary international law of
trusteeship, and that Native Americans have a claim under that law that the
destruction of Black Mesa is a breach of the trusteeship duties of the United
States. Part I presents a description of the damage done to the Hopi and
Navajo tribes by coal mining at Black Mesa and demonstrates the current
problems with seeking redress for the damage from federal agencies or the
courts. This section also describes the damage done to Nauru by phosphate
mining and analyzes the implications of the settlement of Nauru's case against
Australia. Part I establishes the history of the concept of trusteeship in
international customary law and the obligations imposed - including, this
comment argues, an obligation to prevent environmental destruction. The
section then establishes the acceptance of those norms by the United States.
Part III demonstrates that the use of customary international law of trusteeship
in U.S. courts will establish a new cause of action for Native Americans
seeking to hold the federal government responsible for the unequal
environmental burdens they bear.
L Two Histories of EnvironmentalDestruction and Economic Exploitation

Nauru and Black Mesa have shared remarkably similar histories since their
natural resource wealth was discovered. Each area bore the burden of mining
without gaining a proportionate share of the benefits. The predominantly
white governments which had promised to protect them failed the native
peoples of each area. Recently, however, their paths diverged. While the
Native Americans of Black Mesa may be unable to find relief in United States
courts, Nauru has received enough money from Australia to enable the
Nauruans to reclaim their land as part of the settlement of a case Nauru

4. Id. Lt 388.

5. Id. at 389.
6. Id.at 390.
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brought before the International Court of Justice. Although Nauru is a trust
territory of Australia supervised by the United Nations Trusteeship Council,7
and Native Americans have a trust relationship with the United States
independent of those in the U.N. Charter, the Nauruan settlement has
significance within the United States. The claim of the Nauruans was based
not only on the provisions of the Charter, but on customary international law.
Since part II of this comment argues that the United States is subject to that
customary international law, the similarities between the destruction of Nauru
and the destruction of Black Mesa serve as evidence that the United States
has failed to meet its obligations to Native Americans in the same way that
Australia failed the Nauruans. Only members of the United Nations may bring
a case before the International Court of Justice.8 However, since the United
States Supreme Court has held that international law is part of U.S. law,9 the
environmental obligations established by the Nauru case offer hope to Native
Americans suffering from the destruction of Black Mesa for judicial relief in
U.S. courts.
A. Destruction of Native American Land with the Consent of the Federal
Government
1. Coal Mining on Black Mesa
"Six days a week, 24 hours a day, draglines rip back the earth to expose
the rich, 14-feet-thick veins of coal that crisscross Black Mesa."'" The
Peabody Coal Company mines approximately 12 million tons of coal each
year from the two strip mines it has leased from the Navajo and Hopi
tribes." Peabody Coal is the biggest coal producer in the United States and
has been mining Black Mesa for more than three decades.'2 While mining
provides employment for some members of the tribes and mining royalties
account for a very high portion of tribal revenues, mining is also creating
environmental devastation, and an equitable share of the profits of coal is not
being reaped by the Native American owners. 3
Coal mining began on Black Mesa in the 1930s, when the federal
government began operating a mine. 4 In 1964, Peabody signed its first
contract with the Navajo and was allowed to mine on more than 24,000 acres

7. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 296 (3d ed. 1993).
8. Id. at 807.
9. Id. at 60 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
10. Bruce Cory, A New Generation of Navajos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1984, at 156
[hereinafter A New Generationof Navajos].
11. Id.
12. Elliot Diringer, Drying Springs Threaten Hopis: Arizona Indians Say Big Coal Mine is
Diverting Scarce Water, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 1993, at Al.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 19-54.
14. Mary Joan Martin, Navajo Find Their Rainbow's Pot of Gold... in Coal, CoAL, Nov.

1992, at 32.
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of Black Mesa. 5 In 1966, the Navajo and Hopi leased an additional 40,000
acres of land to the company. 6 The agreements were modified in 1987, and
Peabody received the right to mine an additional 270 million tons of coal
from the existing lease area, while the tribes received greater coal and water
royalties. 7
When Peabody first began mining at Black Mesa, the techniques used to
reclaim land after mining were basic and largely unsuccessful. 8 The
indications are that Peabody is not meeting with much greater success today,
despite the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA). 9 Robert Curry, a hydrologist and professor of
Environmental Studies at University of California-San Jose, has studied the
efforts at Black Mesa and found that reclamation is happening too slowly."0
Topsoil, trees, and plants are stripped two years before mining, resulting in
lost nutrients, erosion, and food shortages for wildlife. Compounding the
problem, Peabody has failed to establish new drainage systems which would
prevent some of the extensive, and unnecessary, erosion.2' In addition,
Professor Curry believes that reclamation standards for the Peabody mine are
not adequate to support future uses of the land after mining operations end.2
Members of the Navajo and Hopi tribes also believe that the reclamation
goals are wrong. Oak and pine are needed for shelter, tools, ceremonial uses,
and foodY While Peabody has promised to replant oak and other needed
plants in 2020, the tribes and the animals they depend on need the vegetation
now. Many medicinal plants needed for healing are now extinct, and the few
plant species which Peabody has managed to grow are no longer sturdy.'
There are other indications that Peabody has failed to take its reclamation
obligations seriously. The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) was organized
under SMCRA as an agency of the Department of Interior (DOI)." Its
mission is to administer a nationwide program to protect citizens and the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Ld.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).

20. WATER INFORMATION NETWORK (WIN), THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF COAL

DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS -

BLACK MESA MEETING, OCTOBER 9-10, 1993, at 2 (1993)

[hereinafter WIN].
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2. One reason is that current reclamation standards are based on conditions in
Wyoming and Montana, where there is much more rainfall than in northern Arizona.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.at 8.

25.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE INSPECTION

PRACTICES OF THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING

RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, TO

SUBCOMMFTEE ON INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

3 (1993) [hereinafter APPROPRIATIONS

REPORT].
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environment from the adverse effects of past and current coal mining
operations.' Title IV of SMCRA created the Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund, to be administered by the Secretary of Interior and funded by a fee
imposed on all operators of coal mining operationsY The Fund is to be used
for "reclamation and restoration of land and water resources adversely affected
by past coal mining."' An OSM audit discovered that Peabody did not
properly report the tonnage of coal it mined or pay the reclamation fees owed
on the coal.' In response, OSM and Peabody Western Coal have signed an
agreement which requires the company to pay $900,000 in overdue abandoned
mine land reclamation fees, interest, and penalties."
The Navajo have reported other signs of environmental destruction.
Blasting at the mine causes the ground to shake and damages homes. Water
is polluted from mining operations, and livestock get sick from drinking
polluted water. Wells are going dry. There is air pollution from coal dust and
the smoke of burning coal? Some on the reservation report that "[o]ur water
is disappearing and the water quality is getting very bad. The mine is not
minimizing damage to our water."32 Deep wells are drilled which
contaminate the Navajo aquifer in the mine site, but monitoring is not close
enough to the mine site to show the vertical contamination of the vital deep
water supply.33 Other observers declare that, "[s]urface streams, springs and
washes are drying up. The salts in the springs, lakes and wells may be toxic
based on dying trees. Livestock won't drink or get sick if they do. No
radiochemical, heavy metal, or toxic metal monitoring is being conducted."'
To transport the coal it mines, Peabody utilizes an unusual slurry line
which mixes coal with water and pumps it 273 miles to a power plant serving
Southern California.' The lower levels of water noticed by the Native
Americans may be explained by the fact that the slurry line uses more than
a billion gallons of water a year. 6 Despite earlier federal studies supporting
Peabody's claims that the mine's pumping poses no threat to Hopi springs and
wells, the United States Geological Study now states that not only is its data
insufficient, but its computer model is incapable of accurately assessing the

26. Id.
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1232 (1994). The reclamation fee is "35 cents per ton of coal produced by
surface coal mining and 15 cents per ton of coal produced by underground mining or 10% of the
value of the coal at the mine, as determined by the Secretary, whichever is less." Id.
28. 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(1) (1994).
29. OSM and Peabody Western Coal Have Signed an Agreement, INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 6,

1993, at 15.
30. Id.
31. WIN, supra note 20, at 6.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Diringer, supra note 12.

Id.
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problem. 7 The Environmental Protection Agency reviewed an environmental
impact study of the mine and found that groundwater pumping might harm the
aquifer. '[t stated that "the wisdom of continuing use of this water for slurry
pipeline" was uncertain. "
The chair of the Hopi, Vernon Masayesva, says the mine is beginning to
dry up their sacred springs. "We have no other source of drinking water, and
any significant depletion of our groundwater could spell doom for our
tribe."39 The Hopi village of Old Oraibi in Black Mesa has been inhabited
for more than eight centuries, and archeologists believe it to be North
America's oldest continually occupied settlement. Both the Hopi and
Navajo tribes state that sources of water which have supported their people
for centuries are drying up.4' Most of the Hopi rely on the Navajo aquifer
for water, and all Hopi farmers use water from nearby streams.4"
Furthermore, springs have always been considered sacred places for
ceremonies.43 The United States Geological Survey has confirmed that in
1990 the stream which drains Black Mesa was dry downstream of the mine
during the area's traditional high water season."
The Hopi have suggested that the Colorado River be used as an alternative
water supply for the mine. They believe this solution will be inexpensive for
individual electricity consumers, and will .spare a uniquely pure water
source.45 In 1987, the company refused to consider using a different type of
transportation system, but raised its royalty rates to $300 an acre/foot from the
$2 an acre/foot they had been paying.' The Hopi have asked Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt to deny the renewal of Peabody's operating permit in
the absence of an alternative method for transporting the coal.47 Three years
ago the tribe was initially successful in its efforts when then-Interior Secretary
Manuel Lujan, Jr., overruled his department's OSM and delayed the permit in
order to allow further studies of the mine's impact on the aquifer and of
alternatives for transporting the coal.48
Peabody has caused these environmental problems while, for most of the
history of its mining, sharing very little of its profits from the Indians' coal
37. Id.
38. Hopis Feel Their Life Blood DrainingAway, supra note 1.
39. Diinger, supra note 12.
40. Id.
41. La-wrence Lack, Indians Criticize Mine's Water Use, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, June 27,
1990, at 8 [hereinafter Indians Criticize Mine's Water Use].
42. Id
43. Diinger, supra note 12.
44. Indians Criticize Mine's Water Use, supra note 41.
45. Difinger, supra note 12.
46. Peabody Permitin Arizona Delayed Over Tribes' Water Concerns, INSIDE ENERGY, July
16, 1990, at 13.
47. Hopis Feel Their Life Blood DrainingAway, supra note 1.
48. Id.
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resources. Peabody mines Black Mesa with the consent of both the Hopi and
the neighboring Navajo. In exchange, the company pays the two tribes
royalties of more than $33 million a year. The $11 million in royalties the
Hopi collected last year make up more than 80% of the tribal government's
annual budget.49
However, those royalty rates are very recent - until the end of the 1980s,
royalties were paid according to the terms of the coal leases signed in the
1950s and 1960s.' The rates, ranging from fifteen cents to thirty-seven cents
a ton were fixed, rather than based on the market price of the coal." When
the price of coal rose to $10 and $20 per ton, the coal companies were able
to pay the same low price they had paid when coal was $2 per ton.' One
scholar who analyzed the terms of both the Navajo coal leases and similar
agreements made with lesser developed countries found that the Navajos'
agreements are "among the worst ever made."
The DOI is the trustee of Indian lands and, through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, "is responsible for all phases of minerals management through the
leasing process."' Most Indian coal leases had fixed royalty rates because
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had not established a coal-lease rate policy based
on the selling price of coal. 5 It is clear that the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
despite its position as trustee for American Indians, signed contracts with
developers that gave tribes just a small portion of what their resources were
worth while the developers made fortunes.56 Since the 1970s, the federal
government has maintained differing policies for the terms for coal mining on
federal land and Indian land - on federal land, royalties are based on the
market price of the coal, not on a fixed price." The federal government was
aware of the inadequacy of fixed royalty rates, yet the agency responsible for
Indian lands did nothing to solve the problem.
Federal agencies also are failing to fulfill their responsibilities after the coal
mining contracts are signed. OSM field inspectors are the key to enforcement
of environmental protection laws for lands being strip-mined; yet in 1981, the
Secretary of Interior reorganized OSM and reduced the number of field

49. Diringer, supra note 12.
50. A New Generationof Navajos, supra note 10.
51. Id.
52. New Hope on the Reservations, supra note 3.
53. A New Generationof Navajos, supra note 10.
54. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RED-76-84, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITrEE
ON INSULAR AFFAIRS 2 (1976) [hereinafter INSULAR AFFAIRS].
55. Id. at 22.
56. Liz Forrestal, Indians Scouting for Better Land Deals, CHEMICAL WK., June 28, 1978,
at 25.
57. INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 54, at 23. For example, in April 1971, the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe conducted a sale of exclusive coal prospecting permits on 367,000 acres of land.
The royalty rate was set at 17.5 cents per ton, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not
recommend percentage royalty rates and agreed to the terms of the sale.
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inspectors from 200 to seventy. 8 OSM directors since 1981 have been
perceived by most OSM field employees, citizen groups, and environmental
organizations as opposed to environmental laws and in favor of coal
developers.59 According to DOI officials, in 1991, the Secretary of Interior
told his agency directors to decrease their efforts to enforce regulations
against the coal industry.' The then-Director of OSM eliminated federal
inspection and review of state-issued coal mining permits, despite the fact that
review of such permits traditionally enabled OSM to identify potential mining
operation problems before mining began." From 1990 through 1993, the
Office of Inspector General at DOI conducted nine audits of OSM programs
and operations, conducted ten criminal investigations of OSM employees, and
processed thirty-three complaints involving administrative inquiries.' This
history of the agency demonstrates its lack of respect for both the
environment and the law.
With the arrival of the Clinton administration, it was hoped that OSM
would be more concerned with the purposes and requirements of SMCRA.
However, there are some indications that Native Americans and their lands
will continue to bear the burden of coal mining. Under the new Secretary of
Interior, Bruce Babbitt, OSM is examining its organizational structure, but has
not hired additional field inspectors.' The administration is also studying
ways to "reduce the perception that political considerations are weighed too
heavily in OSM, ''4 studying ways to ensure effective oversight of the
Abandoned Mine Land Program,' reviewing ways to ensure that OSM's
regulatory oversight is more uniform,' and working to improve the
implementation of citizen participation provisions in SMCRA.67 The new
administration has not, however, proved to be any more receptive to Native
Americans' concerns than previous administrations.
At Black Mesa, the Peabody Coal mine uses two facilities without permits,
a slurry pipeline and an eighty-three-mile-long rail line used solely by the
mine. The Citizens Coal Council, the Water Information Network, and the
Dineh-Hopi Alliance have filed formal complaints to require the pipeline and
rail line to get permits mandated under SMCRA. More than 270 Navajo,

58. APPROPRIATIONS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
59. Id. at i.

60. Id.
61. Id. at iii.
62. Id.
63. OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, RESPONSE TO THE REPORT TO
THE COMMITTIEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 3 (1993).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id at 9.
Telephone Interview with Will Collette, Citizens Coal Council (Mar. 24, 1994).
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mostly tribal elders, signed the complaints.' A federal inspector determined
that the facilities did require permits.!' OSM regulations require that, upon
such a determination, an order to cease mining operations must be issued.
Under orders from his superior, however, the inspector did not follow
regulations. 7 The Alliance has now filed suit in the DOI Office of Hearings
and Appeals.'
Coal mining is destroying the land and water of Black Mesa, and the
Native Americans who bear the burdens of environmental destruction cannot
count on the federal agencies charged with protecting them to ensure that
destruction is mitigated, much less prevented, to ensure that mining contracts
provide for the highest possible income to the tribes, or to ensure that
royalties from mining are collected in a timely and efficient manner. Hopi
tribal chief Vernon Masayesva states that the Hopi are unsure whether they
want to permanently shut down the mine. "But if it's a choice between money
and water, we'll take the water. We'll still survive. We've survived here for
thousands of years. But we can't survive without the water."' This situation
is untenable under notions of fairness and equity, but current interpretations
of the law may not offer Native Americans much relief.
2. Difficulties Addressing Environmental Inequitiesfor Native Americans
in U.S. Courts
Although the Constitution only specifically grants Congress authority with
regard to commerce with tribes, Congress has extended its power over almost

69. ld.
70. Memo from Mitchell Rollings, Reclamation Specialist, to Robert H. Hagen, Director,
OSM Albuquerque Field Office 2 (Nov. 10, 1993) (citing 30 C.F.R. 816.180 (1993)).
71. Id.

72. Telephone Interview with Will Collette, supra note 68. The pipeline was constructed by
Black Mesa Pipeline, Inc. (BMP) from 1968 to 1970. Memo from Mitchell Rollings to Robert
Hagen, supra note 70, at 2. The parts of the pipeline observed by the inspection had been
revegetated although it is not known whether the corridors were reseeded or volunteer vegetation
was established in the past 23 years. Rock mound strips are visible along each side of the
corridor where rock was excavated to bury the pipeline. BMP was unsure how many spills had
occurred over the years, but there have been at least four in the last two years. Id. Rollings also
determined that the railroad was intimately and wholly dependent on the Peabody mining
complex and, therefore, needed a permit under SMCRA. Memo from Mitchell Rollings to Robert
Hagen, supra note 70, at 3. However, Rollings wrote to Hagen, "While 30 CFR 843.1 l(a)(1) and
(a)(2) require issuance of a cessation order when a surface coal mining operation does not have
nor has timely applied for a permit, I did not issue a cessation order per your direction." Id. at
4.
In response to this action, the Citizens Coal Council (CCC) wrote to the Acting Director of
OSM and requested an informal review of the decision not to issue a cessation order. Letter from
Carolyn Johnson, CCC, to Anne Shields, Acting Director, OSM (Nov. 29, 1993). The appeal was
denied. Letter from Anne Shields, Acting Director, OSM, to Carolyn Johnson, CCC (Nov. 29,
1993).
73. Diringer, supra note 12.
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all aspects of tribal life and interactions.74 The United States Supreme Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, formulated a trust
responsibility doctrine to describe the relationship between Native Americans
and the federal government.' Later courts have applied the trust doctrine
inconsistently, and have allowed congressional action which seems to violate
the trust responsibility articulated by Marshall.76 The current Supreme Court
does not appear to recognize any trust duties but those Congress imposes upon
itself or federal agencies, and the Court is very reluctant to find that Congress
has imposed such duties upon itself. While the Court is more likely to find
that an agency has trust responsibilities, it has held that those responsibilities
are shaped by the statute and the regulations the agency itself issues. Though
the Court recognizes the long history of the trust relationship between Native
Americans and the federal government, it clearly does not believe that the
trust relationship establishes any substantive rights for Native Americans.'
This move away from Marshall's trust doctrine, combined with the Court's
reluctance to find any right beyond a right to proper agency process, make it
unlikely that the Hopi and Navajo will be able to receive substantial relief
from the courts for the environmental inequities caused by the strip mining
on Black Mesa.
The federal government's promise in its early treaties with Indian tribes "to
'protect' the tribes or to 'receive them into the protection of the United States,"'
is the basis for the concept of the trust relationship." In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia" and Worcester v. Georgia,' the first Supreme Court decisions to
formulate the trust responsibility doctrine, the Court analyzed whether Georgia
statutes applied to individuals living on Cherokee lands in Georgia." In
Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Indian tribes were not
foreign states, but "'denominated' domestic dependent nations ... in a state
of pupilage."z In Worcester, Marshall held that the state could not regulate
Indians residing on Cherokee Indian lands within Georgia.83 Marshall
analyzed the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act," and found that Congress

74. Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of FederalIndian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1990) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1,cl,
3).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 86-94.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 95-114.
78. Reid Peyton Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of FederalTrust Responsibilityto Indians,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213 n.1 (1975) (references omitted).
79. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The case was filed by the tribe under the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The Court held that it did not have original jurisdiction because the tribe
was not a foreign state within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 19.
80. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
81. Chambers, supra note 78, at 1215-18.
82. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
83. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
84. 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)). The statute prohibited
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consistently intended, in law and in treaties, to ensure tribal self- government
as well as land ownership, without finding any statutory language that stated
such a purpose."
The Marshall concept of trust was reshaped by later courts into a "moral
obligation," under which Congress had no legal obligation to adhere to its
treaties with Indians and could exercise almost total power over Indians.'
By 1903, the Court had rejected the idea that the trust relationship imposed
obligations on the federal government, holding instead that "the power has
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government."87 Federal courts have held that
Congress possesses the power to regulate all aspects of Indian life on Indian
land' and to abrogate or modify treaties unilaterally.89
Courts judge the trust responsibilities of federal agencies by the duties
imposed on those agencies by Congress. Courts have, at times, held agencies
to an independent standard of care based on the trust relationship, but these
cases are rare and inconsistent with the majority of decisions. In Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, the court issued an injunction preventing a
federal dam and reclamation project which reduced the level of Pyramid Lake
on a downstream Indian reservation. The court did not find evidence that such
a reduction of water was contrary to specific language in a treaty or statute,
but instead based its decision on the belief that the water diversion violated
the government's trust responsibility to the tribe.91 In contrast, in Nevada v.
United States, the Court addressed the question of how the United States
may fulfill its obligation to Indian tribes in a situation in which Congress has
imposed a conflicting duty by statute. The Court held that
the United States undoubtedly owes a strong fiduciary duty to its
Indian wards .... But where Congress has imposed upon the
United States, in addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a
duty to obtain water rights for reclamation projects, and has even

purchase of or intrusions upon Indian lands by states or private persons. Chambers, supra note
78, at 1217 n.25.
85. Chambers, supra note 78, at 1218.
86. Id. at 1225-26.
87. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (rejecting suit to enjoin enforcement
of a statute which authorized sale of unallotted tribal lands despite the fact that it conflicted with
an 1867 treaty expressly prohibiting any -sale of reservation lands without the consent of the
Indians on the reservation).
88. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding constitutionality of the
Major Crimes Act and its application to Indians committing crimes against other Indians in Indian
country, although previously federal criminal law had not applied in such cases).
89. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
90. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
91. Chambers, supra note 78, at 1233-34.
92. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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authorized the inclusion of reservation lands within a project, the
analogy of faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for
purposes of evaluating the authority of the United States to
represent different interests.93
The Court further stated that the government "cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary."'
The current Court's position on the trust relationship is that it will not
recognize any trust duties that Congress does not impose on itself or its
agencies. The Court's position is best understood through analysis of the
Mitchell I and Mitchell H decisions - cases brought by the same plaintiffs,
the Quinault Tribe and 1465 individual allottees of land contained in the
Quinault Reservation, and containing the same allegations, but with different
causes of action. In Mitchell I, the question was whether the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887 authorized the award of money damages against the
United States for mismanagement of forests on lands allotted to Indians under
the Act.9' Under the General Allotment Act, the Government allotted all of
the Reservation's land in trust to individual Indians.' Other enactments of
Congress require the Secretary of Interior to manage these forests, sell the
timber, and pay the proceeds of such sales, less administrative expenses, to
the allottees.Y
Section 5 of the General Allotment Act provided that the United States
would retain title to the allotted lands "in trust for the sole use and benefit of
the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made."98 The Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's holding that this language created an express
trust, and its conclusion that money damages were available when a trustee
violated a fiduciary duty." The Supreme Court instead concluded that "the
Act created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and
the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage
timber resources."' "IaThe Court believed that Congress used the words
"hold the land.., in trust" not because it wished the Government to control
use of the land and be subject to money damages for breaches of fiduciary
duty, but simply because it wished to prevent the land from passing out of
Indian ownership and to ensure that allottees would not have to pay state

93. Id at 142.
94. Id.
at 128.
95. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell i).
96. Section 1 of the General Allotment Act authorized the President to allot to each Indian
resident on a reservation up to 80 acres of agricultural land or 160 acres of grazing land found
within the reservation. Id. at 540.
97. Id. at 537.
98. Id. at 541 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 348).

99. Id.
100. IZd
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taxes."' As Justice White wrote in dissent, "[t]he Act could hardly be more
explicit as to the status of allotted lands. They are to be held by the United
States 'in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian.' The United States has
here unmistakably assumed the obligation to act as trustee of the lands with the
Indian allottees as beneficiaries."'0 The majority opinion demonstrates how
very reluctant the Court is to find general obligations of trusteeship in the
relations between Native Americans and the federal government.
In Mitchell 11, the plaintiffs based their claim of mismanagement on the
broad range of statutes and regulations governing timber management. 3
The Supreme Court found that the DOI exercised "comprehensive" control
over the harvesting of Indian timber." The Secretary of Interior has broad
statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations: sales must be
"based upon consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner
and his heirs."'0" The proceeds from such sales are to be used for the benefit
of the Indians or transferred to the Indian owner." In 1911, the DOI's
Office of Indian Affairs promulgated detailed regulations covering its
responsibilities in "managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest
revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improvement
of the forests.""
The Court, therefore, distinguished the first Mitchell case, and wrote that
[i]n contrast to the bare trust created by the General Allotment
Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the
Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources
and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby establish a
fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United States'
fiduciary responsibilities."'
The Court further held that when the federal government establishes such
extensive controls it establishes a fiduciary relationship." Indeed, the Court
found that all of the necessary elements of a common-law trust were present:
a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust
corpus (Indian land, timber, and funds).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 547 (citation omitted).
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell 11).
Id. at 209.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 406(a)).
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 406(a), 407).
107. Id. at 220 (citing OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'r OF INTERIOR, REGULATIONS
AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF FORESTS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 4 (1911)).
108. Id. at 224.
109. Id.
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[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute
(or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust, or
fiduciary connection."'
The Court did mention Marshall's concept of a trust relationship when it
declared that "[o]ur construction of these statutes and regulations is reinforced
by the undisputed evidence of a general trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian people."' The Court went on to cite the previously
recognized .'distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government2
in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."'1
Given the existence of a trust relationship, the Court found that "it naturally
follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its
fiduciary duties.'. The Court then declared that
[t]his Court and several other federal courts have consistently
recognized that the existence of a trust relationship between the
United States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a
fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to 4sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust."
While it is difficult to predict results from this line of cases, the Court's
reluctance to find trust obligations for the federal government in the absence
of explicit regulatory language encompassing the trust relationship makes it
unlikely that Native Americans will find relief in the courts for the destruction
of Black Mesa. The Court seems to reject the possibility of substantive rights
under the trust relationship and to find procedural rights only when Congress'
regulation of the field is comprehensive. The effect of that distinction is that
while SMCRA would seem to offer the Hopi and Navajo a statutory basis for
claims to protect their land and water, it is likely that the Court will recognize
only those claims based on procedural errors under SMCRA regulations. In
addition, the Court's long history of deference to agency expertise makes it
unlikely that the Court would find the regulations themselves to be
improper."' In essence, the Court has created a substance/procedure
distinction similar to its interpretation of the National Environmental Policy
Act.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.(quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183 (1966)).
Id. at225.
lId.
(citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)).
Id.at 226.
Id.(citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. at 286).
See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
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In 1970, President Richard Nixon signed into law the National
which established general
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),"'
environmental goals for the nation." 7 NEPA required the federal government
"to use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans."".. To meet these goals, NEPA required all
federal agencies "to consider the likely environmental effects of their
activities.""'
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,'" the Court declared that "NEPA does set forth significant
substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural .... Administrative decisions should be set aside ... only for
substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, not
simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.'' In Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,'" the Court reiterated that NEPA
was designed to ensure a fully-informed and well-considered decision. The
"only role for the court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area ' of
'
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." "
Lynton Caldwell criticizes this as a 'crabbed interpretation of NEPA' because
it views the substantive mandate of section 101(b) as 'largely rhetorical,
imposing no mandate upon the agencies cognizable by the courts."'''
The lesson of the Court's NEPA interpretation is that SMCRA may be
vulnerable to a similar "crabbed interpretation" which would limit its
usefulness for solving the problems of Black Mesa. In SMCRA, Congress
recognized exactly those costs which Native Americans are now bearing:

116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1994).
117. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 1023 (1992).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (1994), quoted in PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 117, at 1023.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994), quoted in PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 117, at 1024.

120. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
121. Id. at 558, quotedin PERCIVAL ErAL, supranote 117, at 1065 (holding that NEPA did
not require the Atomic Energy Commission to reopen licensing procedures to consider energy
conservation measures as an alternative to construction of a nuclear power plant)).
122. 444 U.S. 223 (1980), cited in PERCIVAL Er AL, supra note 117, at 1030 (holding that
the Department of Housing and Urban Development's consideration of alternative sites for a lowincome housing project was sufficient under NEPA).
123. Id. at 228 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 437 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)), quoted in
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 117, at 1031-32.
124. PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 117, at 1066-67 (quoting Lynton Caldwell, NEPA
Revisited: A Callfor a ConstitutionalAmendment, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 18, 18. A full
discussion of the Court's NEPA rulings is beyond the scope of this comment. See Caldwell,

supra.
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impacts from unreclaimed lands disturbed by surface and underground coal
mining "impose social and economic costs on residents in nearby and
adjoining areas as well as continuing to impair environmental quality."'"
Thus, a number of the purposes of SMCRA are relevant to the continuing
destruction of Black Mesa. Congress wanted to "establish a nationwide
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of
surface coal mining operations";I "assure that surface mining operations
[were] not conducted where reclamation, as required by [the Act was] not
feasible"; "assure that surface mining operations [were] conducted so as
to protect the environment";"a and "assure that adequate procedures [were]
undertaken to reclaim surface areas as contemporaneously as possible with the
surface coal mining operations."'29 The reclamation requirements in the Act
include a requirement to ensure the protection of the quality and quantity of
surface and groundwater both on- and off-site from adverse effects of the
mining and reclamation process.' The provisions of SMCRA are applicable
to surface coal mining on Indian lands.'
However, under the current Supreme Court's reasoning, the environmental
destruction of Black Mesa would not be a justiciable issue; the only issue
would be whether the agency followed the procedures it issued under
SMCRA. Section 102(d) would not be held to create an independent right to
halt mining operations which were not conducted so as to protect the
environment, just as in Mitchell I the General Allotment Act was not held to
create a right to a trust relationship' and NEPA was not held to create a
right to a clean environment.' Instead, the Court would determine whether
the regulations were reasonable under the statute and whether the agency
followed the regulations.
Native Americans would have a very difficult time convincing the Court
that the regulations issued by OSM were unreasonable, even if they result in
mining which is unsafe for the environment. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. " established that "[i]f Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of

125. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (1994).
126. Id § 1202(a).
127. Id § 1202(c).
128. Id § 1202(d).
129. Id § 1202(e).
130. Id § 1258(a)(13).
131. I § 1300.
132. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 546.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
134. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court held in Chevron that the EPA's decision to allow states
to treat all of the pollution- emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they
were encased within a single "bubble" was based on a reasonable construction of the statutory
term "stationary source." Id. at 865-66, cited in PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 117, at 746.
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authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation."'35 Once the agency has issued a regulation, the Court states that,
"[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations 'has
been consistently followed by this Court.""'
The result of the current Supreme Court's analysis seems to offer little
relief to the Native Americans of Black Mesa. Since the Court would
concentrate on the regulatory obligations of OSM, relief might come in the
form of a delay in mining while the slurry pipeline and road await permits
and the provision of water from an alternative source. 3 The underlying
issue of inequitable distribution of environmental harms would not be
addressed.
B. Nauru: A Problem of EnvironmentalInequity and a Solution
1. History of Environmental Destruction on Nauru
Nauru is a coral island 3000 kilometers northeast of Australia. 3 ' In the
late nineteenth century, Britain and Germany divided the territories of the
Pacific between themselves. 3 Germany took control of Nauru and
eventually annexed it to the German Empire." At the conclusion of World
War I, Nauru became a League of Nations' mandated territory under control
of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. After World War II,
Nauru again was assigned to the three countries as a trust territory. 4' The
concept of a mandate or trust, which was given legal force under the
Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently under the Charter of the
United Nations, confers rights on dependent peoples and imposes duties on
the nations entrusted with their care. 42 Furthermore, the duties of care were

135. Id. at 747.
136. Id. (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Labor
Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board,
324 U.S. 793 (1945); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947);
Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953)).
137. 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a)(13)(C) (1994) (requiring the provision of alternative sources of
water where protection of the quantity of water cannot be assured).
138. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 1.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.

142. Id. at 6. The mandate system was established under Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. The mandate was applied to those colonies which, as a consequence of World
War 1, had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the state which formerly governed them and

which were inhabited by peoples "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modem world." Covenant of the League of Nations art. 22(1) (Jan. 28, 1919).
The trusteeship system established by the United Nations applied to the mandate territories and
to new territories which were detached from enemy territories as a result of the war. Id. at art.
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to be exercised under the supervision of the international community.,
Nauru is the site of a large quantity of phosphates which are used as
fertilizer throughout the world. Phosphate mining occurred in Nauru under the
controlling governments from 1906 until Nauru's independence in 1968."
In December 1986, the Government of Nauru appointed an Independent
Commission of Inquiry to determine which government was responsible
for
4
the rehabilitation of the island which had been destroyed by mining.1 5
The phosphate deposits lie on the central plateau of the island, sixty to
ninety meters above sea level.'" Before phosphate mining began, the central
plain was used for food production. The trees harvested from the central
plateau also were necessary for building houses and boats. 47 A 1984 paper
titled "Phosphate Mining-Induced Vegetation Changes on Nauru Island"
estimated that it will take centuries for the forest to reestablish itself, and that
a number of indigenous plants are endangered." Nauruans have the second
highest incidence of diabetes in the world, due mainly to the fact that
phosphate mining left the islanders without enough land to grow adequate
"' A study has found that Nauruans have diabetes at a rate more than
food. 49
eight times the rate in Europe and Australia, and diabetes causes a quarter of
the island's deaths.'s"
The destruction of the land has also caused a cultural crisis. Nauru's
nearest neighbor is 250 kilometers away.' Nauruans thus developed a
unique culture and language.'
Nauruans were deeply attached to their
land, and traditional Nauruan skills and recreation have disappeared along
with their land.'"
No matter which country or countries took control of the phosphate mining,
the Nauruans never received the full benefits of the phosphate. From 1908 to
1913, the Nauruans received £1320 from the Germans for phosphate worth
£945,000.'" In 1919, the three mandatory powers. Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, signed the Nauru Island Agreement which
established that they would be entitled to the phosphates of Nauru and that the

77.
143. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 7.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id at xiii.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 30-31.
149. Diabetes: Biggest Killer in Nauru, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAs NEWS SERV. (Oct. 29,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (item no. 1029119).
150. Id.
151. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 1.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id. at 23.
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phosphates would be supplied to them at cost and not at market price.'When the mandate began, the phosphate deposits were valued at hundreds of
millions of pounds sterling.'" Approximately 34 million tons of phosphate
were mined by the controlling governments - mining which destroyed onethird of the plateau.'
The Commission found that the governments made substantial profits,
estimated at $1 billion Australian, from Nauruan phosphate during the period
of control.' The Nauruans received only a small portion of the profits. The
percentage of the profits paid to Nauruan landowners and payments to
Nauruan royalty trust funds were, at various points during the mandate and
trust years: .5% in 1922; .9% in 1927; 4.2% in 1940; 2% in 1948; 2.9% in
1958; 6% in 1965; and 22.4% in 1966."w Furthermore, these percentages
were calculated on a special price the three governments paid for the
phosphate. Because the market price for phosphate was higher than the
special price, the Nauruan share of the actual value of the phosphate was even
lower than those percentages indicate.' 6'
The Commission found that all three partner governments "derived
considerable benefits from the Nauruan mandate and trust."' 62 The
Commission also found that a conservative estimate of the current costs for
rehabilitation would be $72 million Australian. 63 The Commission then
concluded that the three governments were responsible for repairing the
damage they had caused."
2. A Solution to the Problem of Environmental Inequity
On May 19, 1989, the Government of the Republic of Nauru instituted
proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia in the International Court
of Justice regarding "a dispute.., over the rehabilitation of certain phosphate
lands [in Nauru] worked out before Nauruan independence."'"
In its
application, Nauru requested that the Court declare that Australia bear the
responsibility for breaches of the following legal obligations:
First: the obligations set forth in Article 76 of the United
Nations Charter and Articles 3 and 5 of the Trusteeship
Agreement for Nauru of November 1, 1947.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 234-38.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 13.

164. Id. at 374.
165. Nauru v. Australia, 32 I.L.M. 46, 50 (1993).
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Second: the international standards generally recognized as
applicable in the implementation of the principle of selfdetermination;
Third: the obligation to respect the right of the Nauruan people
to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources;
Fourth: the obligation of general international law not to
exercise powers of administration in such a way as to produce a
denial of justice lato sensu;
Fifth: the obligation of general international law not to exercise
powers of administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse
of rights; and
Sixth: the principle of general international law that a state
which is responsible for the administration of territory is under an
obligation not to bring about changes in the condition of the
territory which will cause irreparable damage to, or substantially
prejudice, the existing or contingent legal interest of another state
in respect of that territory."
Australia, in its Preliminary Objections, requested that the Court declare the
Application by Nauru inadmissible and declare that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the claims. 7 The Court held that it did have jurisdiction
and that Nauru had not waived its claim, submitted the claim in an
unreasonable time period, or sued the wrong party. The only objection
accepted by the Court concerned Nauru's claim on the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Company, which had formerly held title to the phosphate
deposits - the claim was inadmissible because Nauru had not raised it in its
initial Application to the Court." The case was then scheduled to proceed.
However, on September 9, 1993, Nauru and Australia filed a joint
notification in the Registry of the International Court of Justice, informing the
ICJ that a settlement had been reached and that they had agreed to discontinue
the proceedings. Under the Agreement, Australia agreed to pay Nauru a total
of $107 million Australian, $50 million of which is to be paid over twenty
years. 69 Article I of the Agreement states that "the above payments are
made without prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that it bears no
responsibility for rehabilitation of the phosphate lands."'' 0 There is also a
commitment in Article 1(2) for Australia to provide development assistance
after the twenty-year period ends.'

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.at 51.
Id.
Id. at 62-63.
Settlement Document, Nauru v. Australia, 32 l.L.M. 1471, 1474 (1993).
/d.at 1475.
Id.
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In Article 3 of the settlement, Nauru waives any right to make a claim
against Australia, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom in relation to the
administration of Nauru during the Mandate or Trusteeship period or in
relation to issues arising from phosphate mining. Australia has sought through
diplomatic channels contributions to the settlement from both States.'"
The settlement included a joint declaration of principles guiding relations
between Australia and the Republic of Nauru. The Governments and peoples
of Australia and Nauru reaffirmed their commitment to a relationship between
the two countries based on respect and cooperation." In addition, the
governments agreed to work together to rehabilitate Nauru and to protect the
environment of Nauru. 4 Finally, Australia agreed to provide assistance to
contribute to development and self-reliance in Nauru." 5
Although the settlement was entered into without prejudice to Australia's
contention that it was not responsible for the damage to the island, when
placed within the context of recent developments in Australia, this case can
stand for the proposition that there is a new awareness of the environmental
equity responsibilities of a trust relationship. Until the late 1970s, Australian
courts refused to recognize an Aboriginal right to territory.'76 However, the
courts have become increasingly open to an argument that Aboriginal peoples
have rights to their traditional lands." One court based its decision on
international law, stating that international law indicated that Australian
rejection of Aboriginal title was wrong."' The Australian High Court is
considering the question of whether the Commonwealth government breached
its fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal owners when it forced them to sign a
uranium mining agreement without fully disclosing the terms." In addition,
the courts have found that Australia has international responsibilities to both
Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders."
Recognition of equity issues has also come in the legislative branch. Most
Australian states have passed legislation to establish Aboriginal land rights
and to protect Aboriginal sacred sites.'' Placed within the context of
Australia's changing perception of the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the
government's responsibility for preserving those rights, Australia's decision to
settle the Nauruans' case can be seen as an implicit recognition that a trustee

172. Id.
173. Id. at 1476.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Julie Cassidy, The Enforcement of AboriginalRights in Customary InternationalLaw,
4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 59, 72 (1993).

177. Id.
178. Id.at 73.
179. Id. at 83 (citing R. v. Guerin, 2 C.S.R. 335 (1984) (Austl.)).

180. Id.at 84.
181. Id.
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has a responsibility to prevent the environmental destruction of a beneficiary's
property. Moreover, Australia's decisions with respect to the Aborigines and
the Nauruans were made in the face of an international spotlight on their
pressure which forms the
treatment,'2 and it is just that type of international
0
basis for enforcement of international law.
II. Trust Law and a Responsibilityfor Environmental Equity
While the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal
government has a trust responsibility toward Indian nations, the Court has not
held Congress to a standard of responsibility independent of those duties
Congress itself chooses to impose. International law may be a source of more
stringent requirements for trustees. Since the relationship between Native
Americans and the federal government is not part of the United Nations
trusteeship system, any more stringent requirements must come from
international customary law. This section explores the concept of trust
doctrine in international customary law and in the law of the United States.
The section also explores the possibility that the recent International Court of
Justice case between Nauru and Australia has identified an environmental
obligation in the customary international law of trust.
A. Trust Doctrine in Customary InternationalLaw
One of the sources of international law is custom. The Restatement (Third)
of InternationalLaw declares that customary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation." Furthermore, international agreements may lead to the
creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended
This
for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.'
section will argue that a customary international law of trust satisfies the
requirements for establishing customary law: (1) there are consistent standards
of state practice, including widely accepted international agreements, and (2)
states follow these standards from a sense of legal obligation. This section
then establishes that one of the obligations imposed by the customary
international law of trust is to prevent the destruction of the trustee's
environment.
The history of trusteeship qualifies it as a widespread and consistent
practice by states. In the sixteenth century, as the European nations
extensively colonized the world, the idea that there was a trust relationship
M

182. Id. at 83.
183. See infra note 202-10 and accompanying text.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102 (1987), cited in HENKIN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 51.
185. Id,
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with the people under their power began to emerge.'" More extensive
discussion of the rights of indigenous peoples and the responsibilities of
colonial powers began with the discovery of the West Indies and South
America by Spanish explorers."'
Jean Lopez de Palacios Rubios (1447-1522), professor of law at the
University of Salamanca, wrote a treatise, Tractus InsalarumMaris Oceani,
which argued that, as human beings, conquered peoples had a right to
liberty."' Bartolom6 de Las Casas (1474-1566) was the first legal writer to
compare the role of the colonizer with that of a guardian when he declared
that a moral duty compelled colonizers to look after and restore the property
of indigenous peoples, just as a guardian must look after and restore the
property of a ward."' Franciscus de Vitoria (1480-1547), a Jesuit theologian,
argued that Indians had a right to control both their property and their
country.'
He too was guided by the concept of guardianship and a
guardian's responsibility to ensure that the ward's interests are protected. 9'
In England in 1783, Edmund Burke promoted the concept of trusteeship for
dependent peoples, declaring that "all political power which is set over men
. . . ought
to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their
benefit.""m
The trust concept existed not merely in the common law, but was widely
shared by the major legal systems of the world. A trust principle can be
found in civil law, Hindu law, and Islamic law."' The principles that the
trustee must not benefit from the trust and that the trustee must look after the
property of the beneficiary with the same care he would give to his own are
also universal.
In Nigerian customary law, "the chief [is] the trustee of the land in his
control.""'" Hindu law explicitly contemplates trust obligations: "He who
steals communal wealth or violates the rules of a trust should be exiled from
the country after being deprived of all wealth."'95 Islamic law also creates
strict duties of care for trustees: "God doth command you/To tender back your
Trusts/To those whom they are due.""
The Restatement (Third) declares that international agreements may
contribute to the formation of customary international law,"'' and the
186. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 77.
187. Id.

188. Id. at 78.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 151.

Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102, cited in HENKIN ET AL., supra
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concepts of trust and mandate are evident in international agreements. Great
Britain was given control over the Ionian Islands under the 1815 Treaty of
Paris by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.' In 1885, the colonial powers met
at the Berlin Congress to divide up the right to profit from the resources of
Africa. As those countries agreed on an orderly means of exploiting Africa,
they also agreed to "bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the
native tribes and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral
well-being and to help in suppressing slavery."'" In 1919, the Covenant of
the League of Nations established the mandate system, and after World War
0
II, the United Nations established the trusteeship system.'
The consistent standards of state practice, and of the mandate and trustee
systems established by international documents, confirm the universal
acceptance of nations of the concept that colonial powers formed a trust
relationship with universal powers. Such consistency is considered evidence
of a customary international norm."°
The second factor in determining the existence of customary international
law is that a practice must be followed from a sense of legal obligation.2"
International mandates and trusteeship are not merely a product of
humanitarianism, they also are an important part of "the working of the state
system of the world."'
The Berlin Agreement was not an act of
humanitarianism, but a legal structure to facilitate the colonialism of European
nations. Thus, states have followed the practice out of a sense of legal
obligation to the international community.
Historically, mandates and international trusteeship have been rooted in
"the decline and fall of empires, in the expansion of states into weak and
backward areas, in the rivalry of states, in spheres of interest, and in the
balance of power."2' 4 The European powers did recognize that colonialism
and the marketing of natural resources had seriously harmed "uncivilized
nations."'2"SThe international law of trusteeship, however, was concerned not
only with lessening the destruction of indigenous peoples and their lands, but
with maintaining international peace as both countries and individuals
continued to search for new territory and expanded opportunities for trade.' 6

note 7, at 51.
198. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 80.

199. Id. at 81 (citing article 6 of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin).
200. H. DUNCAN HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 29 (1948).

201. Christopher Cline, Pursuing Native American Rights in InternationalLaw Venues: A
Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 591, 598 (1991).
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102, cited in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 51.
203. HALL, supra note 200, at 8.
204. Id. at 15.
205. Id. at 101.
206. Id. at 102.
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The history of international governance of Africa demonstrates that the
colonial powers did develop some strict guiding principles for trust

relationships:
The principle of the dual mandate - that trusteeship for dependent
peoples involved not only duties by the colonizing power towards
the peoples under trust, but also obligations towards the family of
nations which themselves also had a collective responsibility in the
matter - was well recognized . . . . Starting from the clear
precedent of the prohibition by international law of the slave trade,
the powers recognized that duties to backward peoples form a
suitable subject-matter for international law.
Although there was not actual international enforcement of the rules," a
commentator pronounced that by 1918 it was "'established as a fundamental
principle of the law of nations that aboriginal tribes are the wards of civilized
States."'2" The lack of enforcement power is inherent in international law,
but there is "horizontal enforcement" through the reactions of other nations,
making the question "not whether law is enforceable or even effectively
enforced; rather, whether law is observed, whether it governs or influences
behavior, [and] whether international behavior reflects stability and order."2 '
The history of nations shows that an international customary law of
trusteeship was observed and did, in fact, affect the way nations behaved.
The customary international law of trust establishes broad obligations. The
essence of a trust is a fiduciary relationship, and the general principles
governing the trust concept throughout the history of nations are that "the
trustee must not benefit from the trust," and that the trustee "must look after
the property of the beneficiary with the same care [he or she] would give [his
or her] own" (the prudent person requirement). 2 ' An additional principle of
the customary international law of trusteeship is a duty to enable the
beneficiary to become independent.
The principle of the League of Nations' mandate system was that the "wellbeing and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation." '
The League believed that this principle could most effectively be
2 3
accomplished through the guidance of "advanced nations,""
thereby leading

207. Id. at 105.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 106 (citing A.H. SNow, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF NATIONS 50-51 (1919) (State Department brief for the 1919 Paris Peace

Conference)).
210. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 25-26 (2d ed. 1979), quoted in HENKIN ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 23-24.
211. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, at 151.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 86.
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them on the path to self-government." 4 The objectives of the trusteeship
system established by the United Nations were "to promote the political,
economic, social, and educational development of the trust territories, and
15
their progressive development toward self-government or independence.""
Nauru's complaint before the International Court of Justice raises the
possibility that nations in a trustee relationship have an obligation under
customary international law to ensure that environmental destruction does not
result from their treatment of the natural resources of aboriginal peoples.
While the Court did not have an opportunity to rule on the merits of the case,
we can learn from its rejection of Australia's call for summary dismissal of
the complaint. Environmental destruction violates the obligations imposed by
the customary international law of trusts. A prudent person would not destroy
the land which provided the only source of food or pollute the only source of
water. In addition, self-sufficiency is rationally related to self-government and
independence - allowing all of a trustee's natural resources to be mined or
allowing grazing land and water to be made unusable is a violation of the
obligation to guide a trustee toward self-government.
This section has found that a customary international law of trusteeship
exists and has identified certain obligations which it imposes on trustees. It
is not yet clear, however, how that law can be used by Native Americans in
U.S. courts.
B. Customary InternationalLaw and Trust Doctrine in U.S. Domestic Law
An analysis of the application of the customary international law of
trusteeship must begin with a discussion of the validity of international law
in U.S. courts. This section first details the general use of customary
international law in U.S. courts, including its use by non-State plaintiffs." 6
Then, because customary international law is binding only on those nations
which have not protested its norms, this section examines the sources and
obligations of the trust relationship between the federal government and
Native Americans.
In The PaqueteHabana,the Supreme Court stated that "[i]nternational law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending on
it are duly presented for their determination."2 7 The Restatement (Third)
states that "[i]nternational law is, and is given effect as, law in the United
States."2 ' A country which enters the international community as an

214. HALL, supra note 200, at 94.
215. U.N. CHARTER art. 76, b.
216. Traditionally, international law is seen as primarily governing relations between States,
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xvii.
217. Id. at 60 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
218. Id. at 163 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. I, ch. 2
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independent state becomes subject to international law." 9 When the United
States became an independent member of the international community after
the Revolutionary War, it became subject to international law. In the United
States "[f]rom the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as
international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law of the United
States without the need for any action by Congress or the President, and the
courts, State and federal, have applied it and given it effect."'
The PaqueteHabana is the basis for the analysis not only of international
law obligations in the United States but also for customary international law
obligations. In The PaqueteHabanathe Court held that a standard that began
as one of comity only could develop over the succeeding century into "a
settled rule of international law," by "the general assent of civilized
nations."'" The case involved capture by the United States of two Cuban
fishing vessels as prizes of war. The Court found that "[b]y an ancient usage
among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into
a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with
their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war."' The Court found
evidence of custom in national law, executive decrees, acts of military
commanders, judgments of national tribunals, and the works of legal
scholars.' The widespread practice of states and the works of scholars
provide similar support for the customary international law of trusteeship.
A more recent discussion of the use of customary international law in U.S.
courts occurs in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.' In Filartiga, citizens of the
Republic of Paraguay who had applied for permanent political asylum in the
United States brought an action against another citizen of Paraguay, who was
in the United States on a visitor's visa, for wrongfully causing the death of
their son, allegedly by the use of torture. One of the causes of action cited by
the plaintiffs was "practices constituting the customary international law of
human rights and the law of nations."' A federal court has jurisdiction over
cases which "arise under the . . . laws of the United States."' The laws of
the United States include both laws passed by Congress and the common

introductory note).
219. Id.at 161.
220. Id. at 163.
221. Id. at 58.
222. Id.
223. Id.at 58-61.
224. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

225. Id.at 879.
226. Id.at 886.
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law.' The court then looked at the history of the Constitution and found
that the common law of the United States includes international law.'
Next, the court searched for an international law regarding torture. The
court found that because many international agreements and the official policy
of almost all countries condemn torture, an act of torture committed by a state
official violates "established norms of the international law of human rights,
and hence the law of nations."' a The court declared that international law
may be determined by legal scholars, the practice of countries, or by court
decisions."3
Courts have held that the requirement that a rule command the general
assent of civilized nations is a stringent one; else the courts of one nation
might feel free to impose their own standards. In Banco Nationale de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,"1 the Supreme Court declined to decide the validity of the
Cuban government's expropriation of a foreign-owned corporation's assets
because of the sharply conflicting views on expropriation between two groups
of nations (socialist and capitalist). Section iHA of this comment demonstrated
that there is no such conflict with regard to the universal acceptance of trust
obligations. The concept of trust obligations should, therefore, meet the
courts' stringent requirements.
Given a customary international law of trusteeship, Filartiga also
demonstrates that Native Americans, despite not being states in the
international arena, may allege violations of international law against the
United States. The Filartiga court declared that its previous dictum that
"violations of international law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are
nationals of the acting state"" has not kept pace with the development of
international law.' 3 The court reached this conclusion because customary
international law opposing torture necessarily protects rights of citizens against
their government. Under this reasoning, the customary international law of
trust must create a right for conquered peoples. The Filartigacourt held that,
in fact, "international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-h-vis
their own governments."' Commentators agree that individuals have rights
under international law."

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 880.

230. Id (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
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While international law is a part of U.S. law, "a violation of customary
international law may be alleged only against a nation that has not protested
that norm."' The United States Supreme Court has embraced the concept
of a trust relationship between the federal government and Native Americans
throughout its history, and has based that relationship on the philosophy and
practice of European nations. This analysis concludes that both the executive
and legislative branches also have accepted the responsibilities of a trust
relationship as an obligation of international law. Since the United States has
not issued a protest, Native Americans may claim that the United States has
violated the customary international law of trusteeship.
The Supreme Court has always held that the federal government has a duty
as guardian or trustee of aboriginal inhabitants of the territory over which it
has jurisdiction."1 As a consequence of the relationship between the federal
government and Native Americans, the Court believed that the United States
had obligations and duties to the Native Americans because "[tihey look to
our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal
to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great
father."iM
The origin of those duties is the European jurisprudence of first colonizers.
In Johnson v. M'lntosh," the Supreme Court declared that America's history
proved the universal recognition of the European principle that discovery gave
title to a government against all other governments, but that the rights of the
original inhabitants could not be disregarded. 2 The fact that the Supreme
Court acknowledged and accepted the customary international law of
sovereign title by discovery and the corresponding principle of respect for the
rights of those already in possession demonstrates that the United States has
never protested those norms.
Analysis of the executive branch, which negotiated the treaties providing
for protection for Native Americans, shows that international law was very
much a factor in the treaties. Therefore, the trust relationship was established
in the treaties because the United States recognized its international
obligations! 4 This interpretation is bolstered by reference to the writings of
President Washington's Secretary of War, Henry Knox, in which he discussed
the reasons for the government's strategy of treaty negotiation with the
Indians. He believed the treaties should be observed with "'the most rigid
justice,"' 2 and declared that a general Indian war would be against the
LAw 194 (2d ed. 1966)).
236. Cline, supra note 201, at 599.
237. Chambers, supra note 78.
238. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
239. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that the law of nations gave Indians the right
of occupancy, but not title to transfer their property).
240. Id. at 574.
241. Chambers, supra note 78, at 1221.
242. Id. at 1222 n.45 (citing Report from Secretary of War Knox to President Washington
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"'principles of justice and the laws of nature.""' 3 He also suggested that
forcibly ejecting the Indians from their land would violate international law:
The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the
soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or
by the right of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them
on any other principle, would be a gross violation of the
fundamental laws of nature, and of that distributive justice which
is the glory of a nation.'
The fact that the principles of the trust relationship between the federal
government and Native Americans are the same as those established by
customary international law is evidence of the international law basis of the
responsibility. In 1975, Congress established the United States American
Indian Policy Review Commission to analyze the legal history of the
relationship between the United States and Native Americans."
The
Commission found that the federal trust responsibility emanates from "the
unique relationship between the United States and Indians in which the federal
government undertook the obligation to ensure the survival of Indian
tribes." ' The Commission also found that the trust responsibility has a
number of sources, including international law, treaties, laws of Congress, and
judicial rulings. ' The broad purpose of the trust is "to protect and enhance
the people, the property, and the self-government of Indian tribes.""
The Commission compared the Indian trust relationship to a common law
trust.y Therefore, the federal government must act with "good faith and
utter loyalty to the best interests of the beneficiary.""0 At common law,
prior consent by the beneficiary was not sufficient to fulfill the trustee's
obligations if "the trustee can be shown to have failed to disclose essential
facts which he knew or should have known, or if he fraudulently induced
consent, or if the bargain was not fair and reasonable."' In addition to good
faith and loyalty, the fiduciary relationship also requires that the trustee
exercise the care, diligence, and skill of a prudent person in managing the
trust assets of the beneficiary." 2 These common law principles have long

(June 15, 1789)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. U.S. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, at III (Comm. Print
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been accepted as directly applicable to the federal trust responsibility to
Indians.'
The Commission concluded that the purpose behind the trust
is and always has been to ensure the survival and welfare of
Indian tribes and people. This includes an obligation to provide
those services required to protect and enhance Indian lands,
resources, and self-government, and also includes those economic
and social programs which are necessary to raise the standard of
living and social well-being of the Indian people to a level
comparable to the non-Indian society.'
These purposes and obligations are part of the federal trust responsibility and
may not be ignored simply because they are abstract concepts or are difficult
to achieve. z s
The fact that the United States' trust responsibilities for Native Americans
have been acknowledged by all three branches of government and that those
responsibilities have been based on customary international law means that
Native Americans may allege that the United States has violated its
responsibilities under customary international law.
III. An EnvironmentalEquity Claim Based on International
Customary Law in U.S. Courts
Having established earlier that there is a customary international law of
trust and that the United States is bound by that law, this section of the
comment explores the possibility of a lawsuit based on the failure of the
federal government to fulfill its obligations and protect the environment of the
Native Americans on Black Mesa. This section provides an overview of the
elements which would form such a claim based on international law and U.S.
statutes.
The effort to find a new cause of action for Native Americans might not
be as difficult as it appears. As commentators have noted, "[t]he statutes
involved in both [Mitchell] cases do not expressly establish general federal
fiduciary responsibilities, do not expressly waive sovereign immunity, and do
not provide an express cause of action for damages."'
Yet, at least in
Mitchell II, the Court was willing to find in favor of the Indian claimants.
The first hurdle which must be overcome is sovereign immunity. In
Mitchell 1, the Court declared, "[iut is elementary that '[t]he United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ....and the

253.
254.
255.
256.
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Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Frickey, supra note 74, at 1153.
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terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to
entertain the suit."' 7 In Mitchell II, the Court provided the means for Native
American plaintiffs to argue that sovereign immunity has been waived. Native
Americans may make claims against the United States in the Court of Claims
through the Indian Claims Commission ActY
The Indian Claims
Commission Act parallels the Tucker Act which states that "[t]he Court of
Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress,
or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States." 9 The Mitchell 11 court held that "by giving
the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the
United States, the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to those claims."' The claim must be for money damages against
the United States, 26' and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of
substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained."'" 2 The
Court lowered that hurdle by stating that the law relied upon by the claimant
a right to recover damages "either expressly or by
may establish
implication."'
A claim against the United States for the damage to Black Mesa would be
based on a reading of SMCRA and the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act
informed by customary international law. The claim would be for both money
damages and injunctive relief.' Mitchell II again provides the means for
making a case that the substantive sources of law implicitly grant a right to
recover damages. The Court wrote that
[t]his Court and several other federal courts have consistently
recognized that the existence of a trust relationship between the
United States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a
fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust.26

257. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 537 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941)).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994).
259. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 211 n.8.
260. Id. at 212.
261. Id. at 216 (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3, (1969)).
262. Id. at 217 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
263. Id. at 217 n.16 (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. CI. 599, 607
(1967)).
264. 25 U.S.C. §396.
265. An analysis of the effect of a request for injunctive relief on a grant of sovereign
immunity is beyond the scope of this comment.
266. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226.
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The Court found that there must be a right to damages because '.[a]bsent a
retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal officials
from violating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed to obtain
a judicial decree against future breaches of trust."'" In addition, the Court
recognized that "by the time government mismanagement becomes apparent,
the damage to Indian resources may be so severe that a prospective remedy
[such as declaratory or injunctive relief] may be next to worthless."'
The international customary law of trusteeship will be used to establish that
SMCRA and the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act provide Native Americans
with substantive rights. The idea of using international law to broaden the
meaning and obligations of a statute is not new to U.S. courts. In Filartiga,
the court declared that the narrow construction previously given to the statute
at issue reflected the fact that "earlier cases did- not involve such wellestablished, universally recognized norms of international law that are here at
issue."' The history and practice of international trusteeship norms are also
well-established, and can broaden the Court's approach to interpreting the
statutes.
As previously mentioned, in enacting SMCRA, Congress wanted "to
establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from
'
the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations."27
In the Indian LongTerm Leasing Act, Congress established that "[o]n and after May 11, 1938,
unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe,
group, or band of Indians under Federal jurisdiction, . . . may, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior,be leased for mining purposes, by
authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesman for such Indians,
for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are
produced in paying quantities."27 Through these statutes, Congress'
regulation of mining on Indian territory is as comprehensive as its regulation
of timber management was in Mitchell II.
A claim based on international customary law would allege that the strip
mining on Black Mesa, the water loss and water pollution, the history of poor
contracts, failed or lagging reclamation of land, and coal mining by nonIndian business entities are violations of the U.S. trust responsibilities. The
actions of the United States must be judged by whether the United States has
acted with good faith and utter loyalty to the best interest of the
beneficiary.2' Furthermore, as the history of the law of trusteeship showed
in part II, and as the American Indian Policy Review Commission declared,

267. Id. at 227 (citing Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 550)
268. Id.
269. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888.
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270. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1994).
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the most important principle of trusteeship is to ensure that the beneficiaries
"have available to them the tools and resources to survive as distinct political
and cultural groups."'
However, while coal mining contracts with fixed-rate below-market
royalties are vulnerable to attack as not in the best interest of the beneficiary,
the more recent contracts with market-based royalty rates might seem to a
court to reflect a reasonable weighing of the burdens of coal-mining against
the benefits of money and therefore to be in the best interest of the trustee.
The court might then find that the federal agency had no obligation under
SMCRA, the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, or customary international law.
However, that analysis ignores the existing unequal distribution of wealth, and
critics have declared that "[w]hen a community suffers severe disadvantage
from existing inequalities of wealth, the voluntariness of its agreement to host
the LULU [locally undesirable land use] is questionable."2 4 The principle
of enabling the beneficiary to achieve self-government is vital to the trust
concept, and within this context, points the courts in a new direction. The
United States cannot be held to have fulfilled its trust obligation by depriving
a community of resources and opportunities until its only options are the sale
and destruction of its natural resources. Because a long-term base of
resources is necessary for the establishment of distinct, self-sufficient Native
American entities, 7 the purpose of the trusteeship as articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall cannot be realized by simply approving the sale of those
resources at a reasonable royalty rate. It may well be that the trust
relationship requires "the preservation of the trust corpus in a particular
form - land and natural resources instead of money." 76 Therefore, the
Secretary of Interior could be said to have the obligation under the Indian
Long-Term Leasing Act to approve only those leasing contracts which will
further tribal self-government.
With these trust principles in mind, the obligations of the federal
government under SMCRA also are greater. The duty to ensure that surface
mining operations are conducted so as to protect the environmentrn becomes
a substantive one. It cannot be enough under international law to fulfill
regulatory procedures adequately while destroying the trust corpus. Given the
trust responsibility, the scarred landscape and polluted water of Black Mesa
are violations of that duty regardless of agency regulations. Under this cause
of action, plaintiffs must prove that environmental destruction is the result of
strip-mining on Black Mesa, but would no longer have to overcome Chevron

273. Id. at 127.
274. Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and tdze Siting
of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1041 (1993).
275. Chambers, supra note 78, at 1235.
276. Id at 1236.
277. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (1994).
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deference and prove that the agency's regulations are unreasonable. The trust
principles also mean that providing an alternative source of water is not
sufficient to meet U.S. obligations to Native Americans. Bottled water will
not meet the religious and cultural needs which the trust is designed to
protect.
As the trust relationship establishes more obligations, it creates more
options for relief when those obligations are breached. In a number of cases,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of tailoring the remedy
to the breach of trust.27 If the breach is of the obligation to promote a
beneficiary's journey to self-government, then monetary damages, without
guidance, training, and education may not lead to further progress toward
independence. While this concern may seem paternalistic, paternalism is the
essence of the trust relationship. Furthermore, it is the breach of the trust duty
which has created the need for further paternalism. Native Americans are the
poorest, least-educated members of the nation'
Therefore, relief must
include education, compensation for past inequities, and opportunities for full
employment on a sustainable basis (sustaining both the tribe and its natural
resources).
For the Native Americans of Black Mesa, then, relief might include
monetary damages for past below-market sales of coal, a restoration fund to
reclaim the land and water damaged by strip mining, immediate cessation of
coal mining, monies to fund a study to discover the industry most likely to
provide employment and income for the tribe for the longest possible time
with the least amount of environmental damage, and money and training to
establish such an industry. This will entail a considerable amount of money;
it is, however, the unavoidable consequence of decades of violations of the
trust relationship by the United States government.
IV. Conclusion
The history of America's treatment of Native Americans is a shameful one,
and the historic burdens they bear are exacerbated as the federal government
allows, and even encourages, the destruction of their environment through the
exploitation by others of their natural resources. American courts have
continuously held that the United States owes a trust responsibility to Native
Americans, yet have refused, for the most part, to bind the federal government
to the obligations such a trust entails. This comment, and the parallel example
of Nauru, have shown that the trust responsibility is not, however, merely a
domestic one, but is in fact a duty imposed by customary international law.
Moreover, the obligations imposed by international law, and acknowledged,
while not followed, by our three branches of government, include an

278. See siqtra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
279. New H~pe on the Reservations. supra note 3. at 390.
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obligation to protect the environment and the natural resources of land held
for the beneficiaries. The federal government's violation of its trust
responsibilities to Native Americans means that it is liable not just in the court
of public opinion, but in the federal courts. America will finally have fulfilled
its trust responsibilities when Native American tribes become, to extend Chief
Justice Marshall's description, domestic independent nations. Perhaps the
effort to find a mechanism for restitution under customary international law
will result in significant progress towards that goal.
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